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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Dr. Daniel Leveto and his wife, Margar et Leveto, filed this 
action against numerous known and unknown Inter nal 
 
Revenue Service ("IRS") agents. The Levetos asserted 
numerous federal constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar cotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971), as well as many federal statutory claims. 
All of the claims arose from an IRS investigation of the 
Levetos and the execution of search warrants at the 
Levetos' home and Dr. Leveto's veterinary office. The 
 
District Court dismissed the Complaint for failur e to state 
a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the Levetos took 
this appeal. 
 
Most of the arguments raised on appeal lack merit and 
do not require further discussion. However , some of the 
 
Levetos' Fourth Amendment claims present important 
issues concerning the execution of sear ch warrants. The 
Levetos allege that the IRS agents, in executing the 
warrants, improperly patted them down, detained them for 
up to eight hours without probable cause or r easonable 
suspicion, and closed Dr. Leveto's business. We hold that 
the Levetos successfully alleged certain violations of their 
Fourth Amendment rights, but we conclude that the 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity due to 
uncertainty in the case law, and we therefor e affirm the 
 
decision of the District Court. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
The following facts are alleged in the Second Amended 
Complaint ("the Complaint"). On May 2, 1996, as part of an 
investigation into Dr. Leveto's tax-r elated activities, 15 IRS 
agents executed search warrants at the Levetos' home and 
the Langdon and Leveto Veterinary Hospital, where Dr. 
Leveto worked as a veterinarian and general manager . See 
Complaint PP 20-21, 23-24, 31. According to the 
Complaint, Dr. Leveto arrived at the hospital that day at 
approximately 6:30 a.m. and was rushed in the parking lot 
by armed agents. Id. P 20. Some agents informed Dr. Leveto 
that they had a search warrant, flashed the warrant in 
front of him, and patted him down, while other agents 
shouted, "Where are the weapons?" Id. P 21. The agents 
escorted Dr. Leveto into the hospital, wher e he was held in 
a small room for roughly one hour and was prohibited from 
answering the phone or speaking with anyone other than 
the agents. Id. P 22. 
 
After an hour, the agents ordered Dr. Leveto to 
accompany them to a location where they met other agents, 
and they then proceeded to the Levetos' home. Id. P 23. At 
the Levetos' home, the agents again displayed a sear ch 
warrant and patted down Margaret Leveto, who was 
wearing only a nightgown. Id. Several agents remained at 
the Levetos' home, where they detained Mrs. Leveto for 
approximately six hours, interrogated her without providing 
Miranda warnings, and conducted a sear ch in which they 
seized thousands of documents, including family medical 
records, personal mail, and most of the publications in the 
Levetos' personal library. Id. PP 24, 106-07, 120, 138. 
 
Other agents ordered Dr. Leveto to return with them to 
the hospital, where they held him in a closed r oom for 
approximately six hours. Id. PP 25, 141. He was not 
permitted external communication and was supervised 
during visits to the restroom. Id. During this six-hour 
seizure, armed agents interrogated Dr. Leveto without 
providing Miranda warnings, while other agents searched 
the hospital. Id. PP 26-27, 137, 141, 145. 
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During the course of the search, the IRS agents sent 
hospital employees home and turned away clients in the 
parking lot, informing them that the hospital was closed 
until further notice. Id. PP 29-30. The agents likewise 
prevented Dr. Leveto from speaking with clients or fellow 
employees or otherwise performing his duties as general 
manager. Id. PP 31-32, 145. 
 
When the search of the hospital concluded, the agents 
took away thousands of documents containing r ecords of 
five companies, confidential medical and financial 
information on clients, and computer softwar e. Id. PP 33- 
34. No weapons were located on the premises. Id. P 36. 
 
B. 
 
The named defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and they contended that 
they were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal 
constitutional claims. The District Court granted this 
motion. Holding that the pat downs did not violate the 
Levetos' Fourth Amendment rights, the Court quoted with 
approval another district court opinion stating that " `the 
courts have permitted police officers to frisk all occupants 
of premises being searched without r egard to any 
particularized suspicion that the officer may have' " and 
that this authority permits the frisking of"even those 
persons who happen to be scantily clad at the time of the 
search." App. 41 (quoting Collier v. Locicero, 820 F. Supp. 
673, 681 (D. Conn. 1993)). With respect to the detention of 
the Levetos, the District Court relied on Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and stated that"during 
execution of a search warrant, police can detain the 
occupant of the premises they have a warrant to search." 
App. 41. In addition, the Court held that "no r easonable 
officer in the defendants' position would have believed that 
their conduct violated clearly established constitutional 
rights." Id. at 42. This appeal followed. 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
Our review of both a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) and a grant of qualified immunity is plenary. Board 
of Trustees of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local 6 of New 
Jersey Welfare Fund v. Wettlin Assocs., Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 
272 (3d Cir. 2001); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. 
M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1999). In reviewing the 
dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), we must"accept 
the allegations of the complaint as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff[s]." Board of T rustees, 237 F.3d at 272. Dismissal 
is proper "only if it is clear that no r elief could be granted 
under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with 
the allegations." Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 2001 WL 
533654, *3 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
This same approach must be followed when qualified 
immunity is asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Although 
immunity is an affirmative defense, "a complaint may be 
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an 
affirmative defense . . . appears on its face." ALA, Inc. v. 
CCAir, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 5A 
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 1357, at 358-59 (1990) (citing cases). Thus, 
qualified immunity " `will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion 
only when the immunity is established on the face of the 
complaint.' " Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F .3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 
1996) (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , Pani v. Empire Blue 
Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (official 
immunity); Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 
F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 
B. 
 
The principles governing claims of qualified immunity are 
well-established. Under this doctrine, "gover nment officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
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Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also 
Torres v. United States, 200 F .3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 130 (3d Cir . 1992). The 
doctrine of qualified immunity "provides ample protection to 
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); 
see also Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F .3d 1241, 1255 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
In determining whether qualified immunity applies in a 
specific case, we "first determine whether the plaintiff has 
alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at 
all." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting 
Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)); see also Assaf 
v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir . 1999); Siegert v. Gilley, 
500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) ("A necessary concomitant to the 
determination of whether the constitutional right asserted 
by a plaintiff is `clearly established' at the time the 
defendant acted is the determination of whether the 
plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at 
all."); Torres, 200 F .3d at 184 ("A court . . . need not 
consider whether the right implicated was clearly 
established . . . if the plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation 
of a constitutional right."); Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1247, 1255.1 
"[I]f so, [we] proceed to deter mine whether that right was 
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." 
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609 (quoting Conn , 526 U.S. at 290); 
see Assaf, 178 F.3d at 174. 
 
A right may be clearly established even if ther e is no 
"previous precedent directly in point." Good v. Dauphin 
County Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 
1092 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Assaf, 178 F.3d at 177. "The 
ultimate issue is whether . . . reasonable officials in the 
defendants' position at the relevant time could have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have said, however, that"[w]here appropriate, we may consider 
whether the constitutional rights asserted . . . wer e `clearly 
established' 
at the time the individual officials acted, without initially deciding 
whether a constitutional violation was alleged at all." Giuffre, 31 F.3d 
at 
1255; see also Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 607 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994)(en 
banc). 
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believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that 
their conduct would be lawful." Good, 891 F.2d at 1092; 
see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) 
("[I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent"; otherwise qualified immunity is available.); 
Assaf, 178 F.3d at 177 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 
640); Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Good, 891 F.2d at 
1092); Shea, 966 F.2d at 130 (" `Clearly established rights' 
are those with contours sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates 
that right."). 
 
If a reasonable official would have known that the 
conduct was unlawful, qualified immunity is generally not 
available.2 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 ("If the law was 
clearly established, the immunity defense or dinarily should 
fail, since a reasonably competent public official should 
know the law governing his conduct."); Assaf, 178 F.3d at 
181 (Where "[a]ny hypothetical r easonable official should 
have known that" a state employee's position was protected 
by the First Amendment, qualified immunity was not 
available.); Shea, 966 F.2d at 130 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 818). If, on the other hand, the law was not clearly 
established or a reasonable official could have believed the 
actions to be lawful, the official is entitled to immunity. See 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 
492, 493-94 (3d Cir. 1995); Giuffr e, 31 F.3d at 1256-57; 
Shea, 966 F.2d at 130; Good, 891 F.2d at 1092. 
 
In this case, we must decide whether, "accept[ing] the 
allegations of the complaint as true and draw[ing] all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff[s]," Board of T rustees, 237 F.3d at 272, "a 
reasonable [agent] could have believed[the IRS agents' 
actions in conducting the search] to be lawful, in light of 
clearly established law and the information the searching 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. "[I]f the official pleading the [qualified immunity] defense claims 
extraordinary circumstances and can pr ove that he neither knew nor 
should have known of the relevant legal standar d, the defense should be 
sustained." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. No extraordinary circumstances 
appear on the face of plaintiffs' Complaint, nor have defendants sought 
to fit within this exception. 
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[agents] possessed." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641; see also 
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615; Torr es, 200 F.3d at 184. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
Dr. and Mrs. Leveto complain that the IRS agents violated 
the Fourth Amendment in patting them down during the 
execution of the search warrants. As noted, the agents 
allegedly patted down Dr. Leveto in the hospital parking lot 
as he arrived for work. The agents patted down Mrs. Leveto 
at her home. 
 
A pat down is unquestionably a search cover ed by the 
Fourth Amendment. As the Supreme Court held in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), "it is nothing less than sheer 
torture of the English language to suggest that a careful 
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all 
over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not 
a `search.' " Id. at 16. Indeed, a pat down can be "a serious 
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict 
great indignity and arouse strong r esentment." Id. at 17; 
see also Complaint PP 166, 174. 
 
As with other searches, the constitutionality of a pat 
down is judged by a standard of reasonableness. See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 19-22; see also Illinois v. McArthur , 531 U.S. 
___, ___, 121 S. Ct. 946, 949 (2001) (The Fourth 
Amendment's " `central requirement' is one of 
reasonableness."); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 
(1990) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment bars only unr easonable 
searches and seizures."); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 685 (1985) ("The Fourth Amendment is not, of course, 
a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only 
against unreasonable searches and seizures."); 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per 
curiam) ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always `the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a 
citizen's personal security.' "). Reasonableness is 
determined "by balancing the need to sear ch [or seize] 
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." 
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)); see also McArthur, 531 U.S. at 
___, 121 S. Ct. at 950 ("[R]ather than employing a per se 
rule of unreasonableness [in this case], we balance the 
privacy-related and law enforcement-r elated concerns to 
determine if the intrusion was reasonable."); Buie, 494 U.S. 
at 331; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109. 
 
Based on this balancing, the Supreme Court has held 
that an officer may conduct "a reasonable search for 
weapons for the protection of the . . . officer, where [the 
officer] has reason to believe that he is dealing with an 
armed and dangerous individual, r egardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual." Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034 
(1983) (pat down allowed when officer "possesses an 
articulable suspicion that an individual is ar med and 
dangerous"); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979) 
("[A] reasonable belief that [a person] was armed and 
presently dangerous . . . must for m the predicate to a 
patdown of a person for weapons."); United States v. 
Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir . 2000) (recognizing "that 
a police officer may conduct a reasonable search for 
weapons for his or her own protection without violating the 
Fourth Amendment `where he[/she] has r eason to believe 
that he[/she] is dealing with an armed and dangerous 
individual"); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 
1092 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A police officer may search a detained 
individual for weapons if he has reasonable suspicion that 
the individual could be armed and danger ous to the officer 
or others."); United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d 483, 485 
(8th Cir. 1989) (security frisk upheld wher e officer "was 
armed with sufficient facts to be concer ned about his safety 
and that of his fellow officers"); United States v. Corona, 661 
F.2d 805, 807 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1981) (officer must "have a 
founded suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that [the 
suspect] was armed and presently dangerous"); United 
States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 159, 161-62 (8th Cir. 1981) 
("Protective searches are authorized only when the police 
officer has suspicion that the individual befor e him may be 
armed or otherwise presently danger ous."); United States v. 
Cole, 628 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1980) (Terry requires 
"that specific articulable facts support an inference that the 
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suspect might be armed and dangerous."). Thus, 
conducting a pat down is lawful when, under the 
circumstances, an officer has a reasonable belief that the 
subject is armed and dangerous. 
 
To justify a pat down, "the police officer must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; see also id. 
at 21 n.18 (The "demand for specificity in the information 
upon which police action is predicated is the central 
teaching of [the Supreme] Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence."); Buie, 494 U.S. at 332; Kithcart, 218 F.3d 
at 219; Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1092 ("[O]fficer, at the time 
of the search, must know of `specific and articulable facts 
. . . .' "). The court must then deter mine whether "the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of . . . the search 
`warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief ' that the 
action taken was appropriate." T erry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; 
see also Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219. 
 
The Supreme Court has also held that possession of a 
warrant to search particular premises is not alone sufficient 
to justify a pat down of a person found on the pr emises at 
the time of execution. In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 94, 
the Court held that Terry "does not permit a frisk for 
weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion 
directed at the person to be frisked, even though that 
person happens to be on premises where an authorized . . . 
search is taking place." See also Clay , 640 F.2d at 160-62; 
Cole, 628 F.2d at 899. Thus, even though the police in 
Ybarra had a warrant to search the taver n in question, the 
police were not justified in patting down Ybarra merely 
because he was on the premises at the time of execution. 
See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91-94; see also Clay , 640 F.2d at 
158, 160-62 (pat down of unknown visitor who arrived 
during execution of warrant not justified); Cole, 628 F.2d at 
898-99 (pat down of individual who pulled into carport as 
police arrived to execute warrant at residence not justified). 
 
B. 
 
In view of the above authorities, we hold that the 
Complaint alleges a valid Fourth Amendment violation 
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regarding the pat down of Mrs. Leveto. In order to pat her 
down, the agents needed a reasonable suspicion that she 
was armed and dangerous, and under Ybarra her presence 
on the premises was not alone sufficient to justify the pat 
down. We recognize that Mrs. Leveto, unlike Ybarra, was a 
resident of the premises being sear ched and may have been 
a subject of the criminal investigation. These ar e factors 
that must be considered in determining whether the agents 
had reasonable suspicion that Mrs. Leveto was armed and 
dangerous. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n.4; cf. United 
States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir . 1982) 
(distinguishing Ybarra, who was "innocuously pr esent in a 
crowd at a public place," from woman who entered 
apartment evidently used for narcotics trafficking with 
individuals apparently involved in an ongoing narcotics 
deal). However, we do not believe that these factors alone 
are enough to provide a reasonable suspicion, and the 
Complaint alleges no other facts about Mrs. Leveto's 
background, her prior activities, or the natur e of the crimes 
under investigation that provided reasonable suspicion that 
she presented a danger to the agents. 
 
In assessing whether law enforcement officers are 
justified in taking precautions for their own protection, 
"[w]e must . . . keep in mind that a thr eat that may seem 
insignificant to us in the security of our chambers may 
appear more substantial to a reasonable officer whose own 
life or safety is at stake," Mellott v. Heemer, 161 F.3d 117, 
122 (3d Cir. 1998), but at the same time we cannot endorse 
a blanket rule that law enforcement officers may always pat 
down any resident who is present in pr emises being 
searched and who may be a subject of the investigation, no 
matter what the nature of the suspected of fense. We thus 
conclude that, if the allegations in the Complaint 
concerning the pat down of Mrs. Leveto ar e viewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Mrs. Leveto's Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated. 
 
We reach a similar conclusion concer ning the 
constitutionality of the pat down of Dr. Leveto. The 
Complaint identifies no reason to suspect that Dr. Leveto 
was armed or that he even owned any fir earms.3 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  Indeed, Dr. Leveto alleges that he is dedicated to animal welfare and 
       that he and his family oppose hunting. ComplaintP 36. 
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investigation into possible tax evasion, without mor e, 
provided little reason to suspect that he posed a threat. 
Moreover, at the time of the pat down, Dr. Leveto was not 
in a building or room being searched but in the parking lot. 
We cannot assume that he would have enter ed the 
veterinary hospital or even approached the officers if they 
had not rushed his car and patted him down. Accor dingly, 
the plaintiffs have alleged a claim for unr easonable search 
based on the pat down of Dr. Leveto. 
 
C. 
 
Although we conclude that the Complaint asserts valid 
Fourth Amendment claims regarding the pat downs of Mrs. 
Leveto and Dr. Leveto, we also hold that the agents were 
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to these claims. 
While we now reject the proposition that law enforcement 
officers may always pat down a resident who is found in 
premises being searched and who is a possible subject of 
the investigation, this was not clearly established when 
these warrants were executed. Indeed, ther e was at least 
some significant authority to the contrary. For example, in 
Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 606 (2d Cir. 1991), 
which the District Court cited, the Second Cir cuit wrote 
that the police "have the authority to make a limited search 
of an individual on [premises being sear ched] as a self- 
protective measure." As a leading tr eatise states, some of 
the lower court cases decided after Ybarra"indicate[d] a 
willingness to allow a frisk provided the person ha[d] a 
somewhat stronger link to the premises than Ybarra did to 
the bar where he was found." 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure S 4.9(d), at 641 (3d ed. 1996);4 see United 
States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576 (D.C. Cir . 1993) (person 
departing apartment to be searched for drugs); United 
States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir . 1990) (person 
who drove to location where search had discovered drugs); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This treatise also viewed the Supr eme Court's decision in Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), as expressing"greater concern about the 
dangers attending execution of a search warrant where private premises 
are involved and persons connected with the pr emises are present." 2 
LaFave, supra, S 4.9(d), at 642 n.76. 
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United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(person who arrived at scene of drug search driving 
resident's vehicle). In view of these authorities, we hold that 
a reasonable agent could have believed that patting down 
Mrs. Leveto and Dr. Leveto was permitted by the Fourth 
Amendment. We therefore hold that the defendants in this 
case are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the 
Fourth Amendment pat down claims. 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
We now consider the plaintiffs' ar gument that they were 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment during the 
lengthy process of executing the search warrants at the 
veterinary hospital and the Levetos' residence. A seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs 
"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry, 392 U.S. at 16; 
see also id. at 19 n.16 ("[W]hen [an] officer, by means of 
physical force or show of authority, has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen . . . we[may] conclude 
that a `seizure' has occurred."); Summers, 452 U.S. at 696 
(Detention of homeowner was a seizure wher e he "was not 
free to leave the premises while the officers were searching 
his home."); Clay, 640 F.2d at 159 (Restriction of freedom 
to leave "by physical restraint or by sufficient show of 
authority" effects a seizure.). 
 
Here, it is plain that both Dr. Leveto and Mrs. Leveto 
were seized. As previously noted, accor ding to the 
Complaint, Dr. Leveto's freedom was r estrained from the 
time of the initial pat down in the parking lot thr ough the 
forced relocation and armed detention that persisted until 
the completion of the search some eight hours later. See 
Complaint PP 20-33. During this time, Dr . Leveto's freedom 
of movement was restricted, and he was even pr evented 
from speaking with others or using a restr oom without a 
chaperone. Dr. Leveto was thus subjected to an extended 
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Similarly, Mrs. Leveto was "seized" when she was detained 
during the six-hour search of her home. 
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As "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment . . . 
[is] the reasonableness in all the cir cumstances of the 
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal 
security," the Levetos' seizures can be upheld as 
constitutional only if they were reasonable. Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 19. "[T]he general rule [is] that every arrest, and every 
seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, is 
unreasonable unless it is supported by pr obable cause." 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 700. However, an"exception [exists] 
for limited intrusions that may be justified by special law 
enforcement interests." Id. The reasonableness of these 
intrusions is determined by balancing the intrusiveness of 
the seizure against law enforcement inter ests and law 
enforcement's "articulable basis for suspecting criminal 
activity." See id. at 699-705 (employing balancing to arrive 
at general rule); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 27; 
Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F .3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
The Supreme Court has identified several law 
enforcement interests that, when balanced against the 
degree of intrusion, might justify a limited seizure pursuant 
to a search: namely, the "general inter est [in] . . . effective 
crime prevention and detection," T erry, 392 U.S. at 22; the 
"interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating 
evidence is found"; "the interest in minimizing the risk of 
harm to the officers" and the occupants of the area 
searched, which is served "if the officers routinely exercise 
unquestioned command of the situation"; and the interest 
in "the orderly completion of the sear ch," which "may be 
facilitated if the occupants of the premises ar e present" to 
open secured doors or containers. Summers , 452 U.S. at 
702-03; see also Baker, 50 F.3d at 1191; United States v. 
Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93 (10th Cir . 1996); United States v. 
Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir . 1991); Daniel v. 
Taylor, 808 F.2d 1401, 1404 (11th Cir. 1986).5 In addition, 
the Supreme Court has found that "[i]f the evidence that a 
citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to 
persuade a judicial officer that" a sear ch of the home is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. A detention may be reasonable even if fewer than all of these law 
enforcement interests are present. See United States v. Bohannon, 225 
F.3d 615, 617 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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justified, "[t]he connection of an occupant to that home 
gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain 
basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity 
justifies a detention of that occupant." Summers, 452 U.S. 
at 703-05. 
 
Whether these law enforcement interests can justify a 
seizure depends on the intrusiveness of the seizure. The 
Court's holdings in Michigan v. Summers and Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), illustrate this principle. 
 
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693 & n.1, police 
officers found the owner of a home descending the front 
steps as they arrived to search for nar cotics pursuant to a 
warrant. The officers stopped and detained the homeowner 
while they executed the search, which located narcotics 
under a bar in the basement. Id. The Supr eme Court held 
that this detention "was `substantially less intrusive' than 
an arrest." Id. at 702 (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210). 
The Court observed that the detention was only an 
incremental intrusion where there was already a warrant to 
conduct the more intrusive search of the home. Id. at 701, 
703. Moreover, the Court noted that most people would 
prefer "to remain in order to observe the search of their 
possessions," and the Court added that "because the 
detention . . . was in [the detainee's] own r esidence, it could 
add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the 
search itself and would involve neither the inconvenience 
nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the 
police station." Id. at 701, 702. Finally, the Court found 
that "the type of detention imposed . . . [was] not likely to 
be exploited by the officer or unduly prolonged in order to 
gain more information, because the infor mation the officers 
[sought] normally [would] be obtained through the search 
and not through the detention." Id. at 701. 
 
The Court found that the detention in Summers  was 
reasonable in view of the limited natur e of the intrusion, 
the law enforcement interests discussed above, and the 
individualized suspicion of criminal activity cr eated by the 
detainee's link to the home being searched. Id. at 705. The 
Court went so far as to adopt a general rule "that a warrant 
to search for contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
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occupants of the premises while a proper search is 
conducted." Id. (footnote omitted). The Court did not decide, 
however, whether this rule would apply if the warrant 
authorized a search for evidence rather than contraband, if 
the detention was "prolonged," or if other "special 
circumstances" existed. Id. at 705 nn.20-21. 
 
In contrast to the circumscribed intrusion pr esented in 
Summers, the seizure involved in Dunaway v. New York 
"was in important respects indistinguishable from a 
traditional arrest." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212. Based on a 
tip that implicated Dunaway in a murder but did not 
provide probable cause for arrest, Dunaway "was taken 
from a neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a 
police station, and placed in an interrogation room," "where 
he was questioned by officers." Id. at 203, 212. He was 
never told that he was, nor was he, free to leave. Id. at 212. 
On the other hand, he was not booked or told that he was 
under arrest, and he would not have been arr ested had the 
interrogation proved fruitless. Id.  The Court declined to 
treat Dunaway's seizure as a narrow intrusion that could 
be justified by law enforcement inter ests and individualized 
suspicion. Id. at 211-16. Instead, the Court concluded that 
Dunaway's detention without probable cause was 
unconstitutional, for "detention for custodial interrogation 
. . . intrudes so severely on interests pr otected by the 
Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional 
safeguards against illegal arrest." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 
216. 
 
B. 
 
The seizure of Dr. Leveto falls somewher e between the 
detentions in Summers and Dunaway. Like the detention in 
Summers, Dr. Leveto's initial seizur e at the hospital might 
be viewed as merely an incremental intrusion, for the 
agents had a warrant to conduct a pervasive sear ch of his 
business, and it might be assumed that a manager would 
prefer to remain during the search. See Daniel, 808 F.2d at 
1403. 
 
However, other aspects of Dr. Leveto's detention were 
much more intrusive and resembled the detention in 
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Dunaway. The length of Dr. Leveto's detention--a total of 
eight hours--is itself highly significant. Furthermore, 
during the entire eight-hour period, Dr . Leveto was 
restricted in communicating with others, and during the 
six-hour period after he was brought back to the hospital 
from his home, he was interrogated. Furthermore, Dr. 
Leveto's detention at his place of business, in contrast to 
Summer's detention at home, arguably incr eased the 
stigma imposed by the agents' search, for it allowed co- 
workers to see how Dr. Leveto was being tr eated by the 
authorities and prevented Dr. Leveto fr om responding to 
client needs. Cf. Daniel, 808 F.2d at 1404 (suggesting that 
one could argue both that detention at one's business adds 
only minimally and that it adds significantly to the stigma 
of the search). 
 
Moreover, Dr. Leveto's detention involved the 
inconvenience and indignity of a forced ride with IRS agents 
to his home and back to his office. The Supr eme Court 
recognized in Summers that a seizur e is more intrusive if it 
"involves moving the suspect to another locale." Summers, 
452 U.S. at 700 n.12 (quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure S 9.2, at 36-37 (1978)). Similarly, the Eighth 
Circuit has held that stopping someone thr ee to five miles 
from his home and taking him back in handcuf fs for the 
execution of a warrant is far more intrusive than the 
detention involved in Summers. United States v. Hogan, 25 
F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Boyd, 696 
F.2d 63, 65 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that Summers 
"certainly did not sanction the search and seizure of 
residents who, at the time of the search, are several blocks 
from their home"). But see Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339-40 
(finding that seizure and return of a resident who "had 
driven a short distance from his home" was valid under 
Summers). 
 
Finally, while it is unclear exactly how long the pr e-arrest 
detention lasted in Summers, the Court did not regard it as 
"prolonged," see 452 U.S. at 705 n.21, and Dr. Leveto's 
eight-hour detention undoubtedly qualifies as pr olonged 
under any reasonable understanding of that ter m. See 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (recognizing the importance of 
brevity in appraising whether a seizure may be justified on 
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less than probable cause); Baker, 50 F .3d at 1192 
(recognizing that prolonged detention may ripen into an 
arrest). 
 
As Dr. Leveto's detention was significantly more intrusive 
than that in Summers, we might well conclude that 
Summers does not apply and that Dr. Leveto's seizure, like 
that in Dunaway, could be justified only on a showing of 
probable cause. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 211-16 
(rejecting invitation to apply balancing test for narrow 
intrusions and holding that probable cause must exist to 
justify "detention for custodial interrogation"); Summers, 
452 U.S. at 700 ("[T]he general rule [is] that every arrest, 
and every seizure having the essential attributes of a formal 
arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable 
cause."). But cf. United States v. Ritchie , 35 F.3d 1477, 
1484 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding "no special circumstances 
showing that the intrusiveness of [the] . . . detention was 
sufficiently severe to preclude application of Summers" 
where suspect was detained as he was pulling out of his 
driveway and held for limited time during sear ch of his 
home); Bernstein v. United States, 990 F. Supp. 428, 441 
(D.S.C. 1997) (citing Summers in holding that IRS agents 
who executed search warrants for evidence at home and 
business in approximately two and four hours, r espectively, 
"had the limited authority to detain the occupants at the 
premises while conducting the search of the premises"). At 
this stage of the proceedings, there is no suggestion that 
probable cause existed to seize Dr. Leveto, and 
consequently, if probable cause is necessary, Dr. Leveto's 
seizure would violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
We need not decide whether probable cause was 
required, however, because even under Summers' balancing 
approach for less intrusive seizures, Dr . Leveto's detention, 
as alleged, was unreasonable.6 We have already discussed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Court in Summers adopted the general rule "that a warrant to 
search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with 
it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a 
proper search is conducted." Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 (footnote 
omitted); see id. at 705 n.19; Ritchie , 35 F.3d at 1482, 1483-84. 
However, the Court explicitly acknowledged that this rule might not 
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the great intrusion on Dr. Leveto's Fourth Amendment 
interests that resulted from the agents' alleged conduct, 
and on the other side of the balance, it appears that Dr. 
Leveto's seizure did little to advance the law enforcement 
interests that were found to justify the detention in 
Summers. 
 
A primary law enforcement interest served by such 
detention is the prevention of flight in the event that 
incriminating evidence is found during the sear ch. In this 
connection, the distinction between searches for 
contraband and searches for evidence is material. It is not 
uncommon for a search for contraband to pr oduce items 
that justify an immediate arrest of the owner or resident of 
the premises, and a person who anticipates that a search 
may imminently result in his or her arr est has a strong 
incentive to flee. By contrast, a search for evidence-- 
particularly complicated documentary evidence--is much 
less likely to uncover items that lead to an immediate 
arrest. Thus, even if the search is successful, the suspect 
may well remain at liberty for some time until the evidence 
is examined and an indictment is obtained. As a r esult, the 
incentive to flee is greatly diminished. 
 
In Dr. Leveto's case, the agents sought evidence of a 
suspected tax evasion scheme. A search of this type is 
unlikely to produce an immediate arrest, and in this case, 
although the agents allegedly seized thousands of pages of 
documents and many computer files, neither Dr . Leveto nor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
apply "if the search warrant merely authorized a search for evidence," if 
the detention were prolonged, or if other special circumstances existed. 
Id. at 705 nn.20-21. The search warrants at issue here both sought 
evidence rather than contraband. Moreover , both Dr. Leveto and Mrs. 
Leveto were detained for a prolonged period. Accordingly, we cannot 
assume that Summers' general rule automatically applies. Instead, we 
apply the analytical approach used in Summers, balancing law 
enforcement interests and individualized suspicion against the 
intrusiveness of the seizure, to determine whether the Levetos' 
detentions were constitutional. See Heitschmidt v. City of Houston, 161 
F.3d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that Summers rejected "a 
completely ad hoc approach," but applying Summers' balancing approach 
where the detention at issue was more severe than that in Summers). 
 
                                19 
  
his wife was arrested. See United States v. Schandl, 947 
F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that tax evasion is a 
crime that is "generally only detected thr ough the careful 
analysis and synthesis of a large number of documents"). 
 
Similarly, there was no compelling need to detain Dr. 
Leveto to protect the safety of the agents. If the agents had 
been conducting an investigation into a type of of fense 
often accompanied by violence, detention for some length of 
time might have been reasonable. See Summers, 452 U.S. 
at 702; Torres, 200 F.3d at 185, 186 (quoting Summers, 
452 U.S. at 702, for the proposition that nar cotics searches 
may erupt in "sudden violence or frantic ef forts to conceal 
or destroy evidence"); Baker, 50 F .3d at 1191 (noting that 
occupants of a residence subject to a drug raid"are likely 
to be armed"); Barlin, 686 F .2d at 87 (noting "the violent 
nature of narcotics crime") (quoting United States v. 
Vasquez, 634 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir . 1980)). By the same 
token, if the agents had possessed information that the 
Levetos were tied to a violent group or had violent 
backgrounds, detention for some period might have been 
justified. See Clay, 640 F.2d at 162 (knowledge that 
individual "previously had been engaged in serious criminal 
conduct" might justify pat down). Here, however, there is no 
evidence that such a threat existed. Dr . Leveto was under 
investigation for tax crimes, and the alleged facts do not 
suggest that he had any ties to violent organizations or a 
record of violence. Accordingly, it does not appear that 
there was any compelling safety reason for detaining him 
during the lengthy search. 
 
Furthermore, Dr. Leveto's detention did little to advance 
the interest in orderly completion of the search. The agents 
apparently did not rely on Dr. Leveto to open locked doors 
or containers during the course of the search. Similarly, 
since Mrs. Leveto was at the Levetos' home, ther e was no 
apparent need for Dr. Leveto to be pr esent at the home to 
provide access. 
 
Nor was Dr. Leveto's extended detention necessary to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. We recognize that Dr. 
Leveto conceivably could have returned to his home and 
destroyed or concealed evidence or instructed his wife to do 
so if the agents had not detained him and restricted his 
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ability to use the telephone. Cf. Bernstein, 990 F. Supp. at 
433 (IRS agents, who were executing warrants at business 
and home, prevented suspect at business fr om calling 
girlfriend at home "due to safety and recor d destruction 
concerns."); Garavaglia v. Budde, 1994 WL 706769, at *3 & 
n.3 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition) (noting that no 
authority was cited for "a clearly established right to make 
a telephone call . . . while being detained during a search 
pursuant to a warrant" and that "other cir cuits have 
suggested that no such right exists"). However , the 
warrants in this case were allegedly executed by a large 
group of agents, and thus it appears that the agents could 
have minimized this presumed risk by executing the 
warrants at the hospital and home simultaneously, rather 
than waiting to take Dr. Leveto from the hospital to his 
home before executing the warrant there. Moreover, once 
the searches of the home and hospital wer e both underway, 
the need to detain Dr. Leveto to prevent the loss of evidence 
was minimal. See United States v. Timpani , 665 F.2d 1, 2- 
3 (1st Cir. 1981) (agents reasonably barred the detainee 
from leaving or calling anyone during the first 45 minutes 
of a five-hour search "until other coor dinated searches were 
underway" to prevent premature war ning). Had Dr. Leveto 
attempted to disrupt the evidence at either site, the agents 
would have been present to intervene. 
 
Finally, it is not clear that the agents had a sufficient 
"articulable and individualized suspicion" to justify even a 
brief detention of Dr. Leveto. Although the Supreme Court 
has found that such a suspicion exists when law 
enforcement officers have a valid warrant to search a home 
for contraband and the detainee is an occupant of the 
home, the Court has also noted that the same may not be 
true if the search warrant merely seeks evidence. See 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-05 & n.20. The Eleventh Circuit 
has addressed this issue and held that the rationale 
justifying detention based on the occupant's connection to 
the premises "is not applicable to a sear ch for evidence, 
because the existence of mere evidence, as opposed to 
contraband, on the premises does not suggest that a crime 
is being committed on the premises." Daniel, 808 F.2d at 
1404; see also Ritchie, 35 F.3d at 1483 (recognizing "that in 
some instances the existence of a warrant based on 
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probable cause would not" provide an individualized 
suspicion of criminal activity); United States v. Rowe, 694 
F. Supp. 1420, 1424 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (r ecognizing 
"that a search for evidence will rar ely give rise to an 
individualized suspicion that the occupant is committing a 
crime on the premises," but noting exceptions to this rule). 
We agree with this reasoning as a general rule. In sum, 
even applying the balancing test used in Summers , Dr. 
Leveto's lengthy detention, as alleged in the Complaint, was 
not reasonable and constituted a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
 
Mrs. Leveto has likewise stated a claim of unr easonable 
seizure based on her lengthy detention. Mrs. Leveto's 
detention did not exhibit many of the characteristics of an 
arrest that were manifest in Dr. Leveto's seizure. However, 
her detention was distinguishable from the detention in 
Summers in that she was detained for a pr olonged period-- 
approximately 6 hours--during a search for evidence. 
Accordingly, her seizure appears to have been significantly 
more intrusive than that in Summers. 
 
On the other side of the balance, the law enfor cement 
interests that might justify her detention wer e less weighty 
than were the law enforcement inter ests in Summers. As 
with Dr. Leveto, the interest in pr eventing flight was 
minimal, and the risk of harm to the agents was smaller 
than it is in cases, such as Summers, in which the crime 
under investigation is one that is often associated with 
violence and in which the search may well r esult in an 
immediate arrest. Cf. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702. Nor do the 
allegations in the Complaint suggest that Mrs. Leveto's 
presence advanced the orderly completion of the search. 
 
Because Mrs. Leveto's detention was more intrusive than 
that in Summers but was not supported by commanding 
law enforcement interests or individualized suspicion, we 
conclude that the ruling in Summers does not extend to 
Mrs. Leveto's seizure. Her seizure could only be justified on 
probable cause. Since there is no suggestion that the 
agents had probable cause to detain Mrs. Leveto, we hold 
that Mrs. Leveto has stated a claim for unconstitutional 
detention. 
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C. 
 
Again, however, we are compelled to conclude that a 
reasonable agent could have believed, in light of the case 
law at the time, that the detentions of Dr. Leveto and Mrs. 
Leveto were lawful. 
 
Because Dr. Leveto's experience fell somewher e between 
the situations in Dunaway and Summers , a reasonable 
officer could have concluded that Dr. Leveto's detention 
would be governed by the Summers' holding. As noted, the 
Court in Summers adopted the general rule"that a warrant 
to search for contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is 
conducted." Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 (footnote omitted). 
While the Court did not extend this rule to cases involving 
searches for evidence or cases featuring pr olonged 
detention, the Court also did not foreclose such extensions. 
See id. at 705 n.20 ("We do not decide whether the same 
result would be justified if the sear ch warrant merely 
authorized a search for evidence."); id.  at 705 n.21 
("[S]pecial circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, 
might lead to a different conclusion in an unusual case 
. . . ."). Nor did the Court decide whether transporting a 
suspect would change the result. See id.  at 700 n.12 
("[M]oving the suspect to another locale""might cast doubt 
upon the reasonableness of the [T erry-type] detention."). 
After Summers, other courts acknowledged, but did not 
resolve, these issues. See Torr es, 200 F.3d at 185 (Supreme 
Court indicated in Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.21, that 
detention might be unlawful "in an `unusual case' involving 
`special circumstances, or' " if pr olonged); Pecsi v. Doyle, 
1991 WL 137597, at *2 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished 
disposition) (leaving "a definitive resolution of the 
evidence/contraband distinction for another day"); Rowe, 
694 F. Supp. at 1424-25 (applying Summers' reasoning to 
a search for evidence, but declining to suggest"a blanket 
extension of the Summers rule to all cases involving 
searches for evidence"). Moreover , lower courts suggested 
that rather lengthy detentions would fall within Summers' 
purview. See Daniel, 808 F.2d at 1405 ("Since the 
dissenters in Summers expressly raised the point, the 
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Summers majority apparently appreciated that the concept 
of detention during searches of premises entails the 
prospect of detentions lasting several hours."); Rowe, 694 
F. Supp. at 1424 ("Although the Summers Court did not 
define the duration of permissible detention, it apparently 
contemplated that occupants could be detained long 
enough for police to complete extensive sear ches."). 
Moreover, dicta in opinions of this Court and others 
occasionally described the scope of the authority to detain 
pursuant to Summers in sweeping terms. See Torres, 200 
F.3d at 185 ("The Supreme Court has held that officers 
executing a search warrant lawfully may r estrain persons 
present at the searched premises."); Baker, 50 F.3d at 1191 
("Under Michigan v. Summers, during execution of a search 
warrant, police can detain the occupant of the house they 
have a warrant to search.") (citation omitted); Rivera, 928 
F.2d at 606 ("Absent special circumstances, the police of 
course have the authority to detain occupants of pr emises 
while an authorized search is in progr ess, regardless of 
individualized suspicion."). Accordingly, at the time the 
agents acted, the breadth of the Summers  rule was highly 
uncertain. 
 
In light of this uncertainty, a reasonable officer could 
have concluded that the extended detention of Dr . Leveto, 
including his conveyance to and from his home, was an 
appropriate incident to the execution of the warrant at the 
hospital. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617 ("Given such an 
undeveloped state of the law, the officers in this case 
cannot have been `expected to predict the future course of 
constitutional law.' ") (quoting Pr ocunier v. Navarette, 434 
U.S. 555, 562 (1978)). Similarly, a reasonable officer could 
have concluded that the Summers rule would govern Mrs. 
Leveto's detention at home, rendering her detention lawful. 
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19. 
 
We are therefore requir ed to hold that the agents were 
entitled to qualified immunity on the Levetos' unr easonable 
seizure claims. Our holding is consistent with those of 
other courts. See Daniel, 808 F.2d at 1403-05 (finding 
defendant agents entitled to qualified immunity where law 
was uncertain as to permissible length of detention and 
applicability of Summers to searches for evidence rather 
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than contraband); Garavaglia, 1994 WL 706769, at *2-*3 
(qualified immunity properly granted to IRS agent on claim 
of unconstitutional, six-hour detention at business 
premises pursuant to search warrant for evidence of tax 
evasion as neither Supreme Court nor Sixth Cir cuit had 
determined whether Summers would apply to search for 
evidence, rather than contraband). But cf. Heitschmidt, 161 
F.3d at 839 (recognizing that Summers did not decide 
whether probable cause was necessary for detention 
pursuant to a search for evidence, declining to give the law 
enforcement interests identified in Summers any significant 
weight, and denying qualified immunity at the pleading 
stage on plaintiff 's unreasonable detention claim); Mena v. 
City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031, 1039-41 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(where officers may have exceeded scope of pr oper search 
and thereby extended length of detention, denial of 
qualified immunity at summary judgment stage was 
proper); Pecsi, 1991 WL 137597, at *3 (Because the Sixth 
Circuit could not tell at the summary judgment stage 
whether "a five to six hour detention [was unduly 
prolonged] when the items listed in the affidavit may well 
have been in plain view" and because "[c]learly established 
law requires that `the officers r emain on the premises only 
so long as is reasonably necessary to conduct the search,' " 
the defendants were not yet entitled to qualified immunity.). 
 
V. 
 
Having concluded that the District Court properly 
dismissed the claims arising from the Levetos' pat down 
and detention, we address one final claim. In their 
Complaint, the Levetos allege that the closur e of Dr. 
Leveto's business during the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment. To the extent that this claim r elies on the 
restrictions placed on Dr. Leveto, those restrictions were 
considered in finding that his detention was unreasonable. 
At this point, we focus on whether the overall inter ference 
with the hospital's operation led to an unreasonable search. 
We have located little authority directly on point. 
 
One district court, however, has addr essed the issue. In 
Bernstein v. United States, IRS agents simultaneously 
executed search warrants at the home and business of a 
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man suspected of filing false tax retur ns. Bernstein, 990 F. 
Supp. at 432. At the business--a delicatessen--"[a]ll 
customers or employees were asked to leave and the 
business was closed for the duration of the [four -hour] 
search." Id. at 432, 433. Accor ding to a declaration 
submitted in the case, closure was "the established 
procedure in search warrants involving businesses open to 
the public." Id. at 432. The court found that plaintiff had 
failed to state a claim based on closure of the business 
because "[t]here is certainly no constitutional right to not 
have federal agents temporarily close a business site 
pursuant to a search warrant in a criminal investigation." 
Id. at 437; see also id. at 441 ("There is no constitutional 
right to have an investigative agency conduct a criminal 
search after business hours or at a mor e convenient time."); 
O'Ferrell v. United States, 968 F . Supp. 1519, 1535 (M.D. 
Ala. 1997) (noting in the context of the discr etionary 
function exception to federal tort liability that 
"constitutional law does not specifically pr ohibit" the 
closing of a business during a search). Thus,"[t]he fact that 
the customers were requested to leave and that the site was 
temporarily closed [did] not pose constitutional issues." 
Bernstein, 990 F. Supp. at 441. 
 
We do not agree with the Ber nstein court's analysis. For 
present purposes, we must assume that the sole authority 
upon which the defendants in this case relied when they 
restricted the normal operation of the veterinary hospital 
was the authority conferred by the warrants that they were 
executing, and those warrants merely authorized the 
defendants to search for and seize evidence of certain 
federal crimes. It necessarily follows that any authority that 
the defendants possessed to restrict the operation of the 
veterinary hospital derived from the authority to search for 
and seize the evidence in question and that the scope of 
their authority to restrict the hospital's operation was no 
broader than was necessary to permit the search and 
seizure to be carried out in an effective, safe, and 
reasonably expeditious fashion. There may be 
circumstances in which a search warrant for a place of 
business cannot be executed properly unless the business 
is entirely shut down for at least a brief time, but the 
allegations of the Complaint do not establish the existence 
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of such circumstances. Consequently, we hold that the 
closure of the hospital, as alleged in the Complaint, was 
unlawful. 
 
Once again, however, we are constrained to hold that the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The 
unlawfulness of shutting down a business simply because 
a search warrant was being executed on the pr emises was 
not clearly established at the time of the sear ch in this case 
and, indeed, as noted, the scant authority on this point 
appeared to support the lawfulness of the defendants' 
conduct. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F .3d 111, 115-16, 118-19 
& n.11 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding officers entitled to qualified 
immunity where the law was not clearly established and 
officers could have believed their conduct justified by 
legitimate law enforcement interests), aff 'd, 526 U.S. 603, 
617, 618 (1999) (affirming grant of qualified immunity given 
"undeveloped state of the law"); Enlow v. Tishomingo 
County, 1990 WL 366913, at *9 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (Where 
officials seized a business "for five days because they 
thought the premises was the site of illegal gambling," 
qualified immunity was available because "a r easonable 
officer could have thought probable cause existed."). 
 
VI. 
 
Because this case comes to us on appeal from a 
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we know only what 
the plaintiffs allege that the defendants did when the 
warrants were executed; we have no idea what facts would 
have emerged if we knew the defendants' side of the story 
or if the case had been tried. However, if the plaintiffs' 
allegations are true, the warrants in this case were 
executed in a manner that violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Nevertheless, because of uncertainty in the case law at the 
time of the events in question, we affirm the decision of the 
District Court on qualified immunity grounds. See Brown, 
922 F.2d at 1118-19 (recognizing that the clearly 
established requirement "may pr oduce distressing results," 
but finding defendants entitled to qualified immunity). 
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